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WYOMING

LAW JOURNAL

RIGHTS OF REMOVAL UNDER THE "ANYTIME"

PROVISION

IN OIL AND GAS LEASES
Upon the termination of an oil and gas lease many problems arise,
not the least of which is the right of removal of machinery and equipment
by the lessee from the lessor's land. Since it is a well-settled rule that machinery and qeupiment may be removed any time during existence of the lease,'
the problem confronting the courts is the right of removal after the lease
has expired. Generally speaking, if the lessee has not removed his equipment prior to the termination of the oil and gas lease, he may do so within
a reasonable time thereafter. 2 In an apparent effort to avoid the necessity
of removing within a reasonable time, many leases provide further that the
lessee may remove his equipment at any time before or after the termination of the lease. 3
By express provision in the lease, the lessee has attempted to secure
to himself not only the legal right to remove within a reasonable time after
the expiration of the lease, but also the absolute right to remove at any
time. It is easy to see that the construction of the phrase, "at any time,"
gives rise to a great deal of controversy surrounding the right of removal in
light of the reasonable period of time qualification. In cases involving
the construction of a lease with the "any time" provision, most courts have
held that such a provision does not confer upon the lessee the absolute right
of removal. 4 Going further, these courts maintain that the provision
allowing removal at "any time" must be interpreted to mean a reasonable
time after the expiration of the lease, 5 thus conferring upon the lessee no
greater right than he had in leases without the "any time" provision. The
reasoning behind these decisions seems to be that it was not within the
contemplation or intent of the parties that the lessee should be able to
withold possession of the fee from the lessor- to the extent covered by his
machinery after the lessee's rights under the lease were terminated by failing or refusing to remove his machinery and equipment." Thus, even
though the lease contains a provision for removal at any time, the lessee
still must remove his equipment within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.
Once the problem of removal has been disposed of, the next problem
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confronting the courts is the determination of that period of time which
may be deemed to be reasonable. Uusally, the question as to the reasonableness of the length of time is one of fact which must be determined by
a jury,7 if there is one, according to the circumstances surrounding each
case. 8 Because of the different set of facts and circumstances surrounding
each case, it would be impossible in the space allotted to attempt to establish a mean by which courts determine unreasonableness of time. Some
courts have held that periods of time up to seven years were not unreasonable.9 Other courts decided that eight months or less was an unreasonable
length of time in which to remove the equipment. 10 Even though some
courts have held that periods up to seven years were reasonable," the
majority of courts maintain that these periods are unreasonable, regardless
of the surrounding circumstances, on the theory that to allow such an
extension of time would be to imply an "any time" provision and uphold
it.'
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Upon failure by the lessee to remove his equipment from the land of
the lessor within a reasonable length of time after the expiration of the
lease, what are the respective rights of the parties in regard to the machinery? Generally speaking, the lessee, upon failure to remove his equipment
within a reasonable time after the expiration of his lease, loses all rights to
the property. '1 The theory which the courts apply to reach this result
is that the machinery and equipment are trade fixtures,' 4 and as such, the
lessee has the right of removal based upon the common law right of removal
of trade fixtures.' 5 Machinery and equipment, as trade fixtures, can be
lost to the lessee by either of two methods, forfeiture or abandonment. To
lose his rights to the equipment through forefeiture, the lessee must be guilty
of failure to remove within a reasonable length of time after the expiration of the lease.' 6 Upon forfeiture of the right to the equipment, title to
that equipment passes to the lessor or landowner upon whose premises the
machinery is located. Some courts, as pointed out previously, will award
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the property to the lessor on the theory of abandonment. 17 Vesting title
in the lessor by abandonment is much more difficult than vesting title by
forfeiture, because to constitute an abandonment in order to give another
party the right to assume title and control of the property, certain elements
must exist. There must be an actual act of abandonment, coupled with
the intention to abandon.' 8 Thus, in those jurisdictions following the
abandonment theory, failure to remove the machinery within a reasonable
length of time, while it may be evidence of abandonment, is not sufficient
to divest the lessee of his rights to the property without proof of the intention to abandon.
Should the lessor and lessee litigate the question pertaining to the
termination date of the lease, it must be understood that the lessee will
not lose title to his property upon the ground that it remained on the
lessor's land an unreasonable lengfh of time.1 9 In such a situation, the
period constituting reasonableness of time would begin from the date on
which the adverse judgment was rendered and would not relate back to
the court determined date of expiration. 20 If the lessor prevents removal
before a reasonable length of time has passed, the lessee may seek injunctive
2
relief in the courts. '
In closing, it might be noted that the trend of some courts is to hold
that the parties may stipulate as to when the machinery and equipment
may be removed, and such stipulations will be binding.22 In effect, these
courts are giving validity to the "any time" provisions, and should the trend
continue, future suits over the right to remove equipment may be governed
by express contract provision, rather than by that resilient commodity, time.
JACK DIXON

PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO DISMISS UNDER THE CODE
AND THE PROPOSED RULES
Like a woman privileged to change her mind, a plaintiff has in the
past been given a right to bring to a halt an action without prejudice to
a later suit during trial.' However, the Federal Rules of Procedure and
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